Can the SC Resolution 2270 Stop North Korea’s Nuclear Dilemma? From the Geneva Agreed Framework to the Washington Communiqué

Eric Yong Joong Lee 562 Gwangnaruro, Kwangjin-gu #201, Seoul 05033 Korea.
Corresponding Author: grotian@hotmail.com
ⓒ Copyright YIJUN Institute of International Law
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Abstract
The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 against North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and its subsequent rocket launch. This resolution contains tougher sanction measures than any others adopted in the past, but is not expected to effectively stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This essay analyzes the critical loophole of the rule of law in global society regarding nuclear proliferation systems as well as regional governance. It further suggests legal and policy options to resolve this nuclear dilemma. The parties concerned are asked to alter the status quo of hostile co-existence and instead revert to the spirit of the Geneva Agreed Framework.

Keywords : North Korea, Nuclear Test, Resolution 2270, NPT, Six-Party Talks, Two-Track Approach, NEA-NWFZ, Kim Jong Un

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