Is Dumping Still Harmful? New Thinking on Antidumping in the Global Free Trade

Ying Bi Zhejiang University Guanghua Law School
51 Zhijiang Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, P.R.China.
Corresponding Author: biying@zju.edu.cn
ⓒ Copyright YIJUN Institute of International Law
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract
The debate on whether antidumping law should be integrated into competition law is a relatively new but very significant one. Building on prior scholarship, this paper attempts to contribute to the debate by reexamining the fundamental justification of antidumping law. An exploration into the economic theories of dumping and the evolution of antidumping law indicates that the current antidumping system neither serves the broad goal of preventing 'unfair trade' nor functions as a 'quasi-safeguard' mechanism. The only rationale for antidumping law is that it deals with international predatory dumping. Modern competition rules target the same predatory conduct but they are more meticulous than antidumping law and are less susceptible to protectionist abuse. In light of this, the paper advocates the substitution of antidumping law by competition law. To achieve this, the paper suggests a gradual approach. Substitution could first be achieved in bilateral and regional trade areas before being implemented at the level of WTO.

Keywords: WTO Dispute Settlement, Second-Order Compliance, Compliance, Panels, Retaliation, Countermeasures, ILC's Articles on State Responsibility

The Full Text is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/jeail.2013.6.1.02

Implementation System of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body: A Comparative Approach

Yoshinori Abe Gakushuin University Faculty of Law
1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588 Japan.
Corresponding Author: yoshinori.abe@gakushuin.ac.jp
ⓒ Copyright YIJUN Institute of International Law
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract
The implementation system of the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body is an important component of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Where there is any disagreement between disputing parties as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, a winning party may refer the matter to a compliance panel and the Appellate Body. If a losing party is found to have failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings, DSB may authorize the winning party to retaliate. This article analyzes the implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure in comparison with other systems of 'second-order' compliance in international law. Also, attention will be directed to the relationship between the WTO retaliation and countermeasures in general international law. Countermeasures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in particular, have a legal nature akin to that of countermeasures under the law of State responsibility.

Keywords: WTO Dispute Settlement, Second-Order Compliance, Compliance, Panels, Retaliation, Countermeasures, ILC's Articles on State Responsibility

The Full Text is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/jeail.2013.6.1.01