Yoshinori Abe Gakushuin University Faculty of Law
1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588 Japan.
Corresponding Author: firstname.lastname@example.org
ⓒ Copyright YIJUN Institute of International Law
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The implementation system of the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body is an important component of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Where there is any disagreement between disputing parties as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, a winning party may refer the matter to a compliance panel and the Appellate Body. If a losing party is found to have failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings, DSB may authorize the winning party to retaliate. This article analyzes the implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure in comparison with other systems of 'second-order' compliance in international law. Also, attention will be directed to the relationship between the WTO retaliation and countermeasures in general international law. Countermeasures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in particular, have a legal nature akin to that of countermeasures under the law of State responsibility.
Keywords: WTO Dispute Settlement, Second-Order Compliance, Compliance, Panels, Retaliation, Countermeasures, ILC's Articles on State Responsibility
The Full Text is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/jeail.2013.6.1.01